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I. Introduction
What role should the government play in administering economic stimulation acts such as
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 2009 (ARRA) 1 in response to a harsh economic
situation? Should the government continue its previous direction of regulation that allows the
government’s active intervention in the market even at this point of time that the Obama
administration is facing for the second term?
The purpose of this research is to determine the most effective way to administer an
economic stimulation act and what role the government should play. More specifically, the paper
will discuss administrative problems and limitations, such as the government’s possible
disengagement 2 from the real market stake holders’ assessment in the ARRA and will provide
possible solutions to eliminate or minimize those defects. Ultimately, the research seeks to satisfy
the real market stake holders’ expectation by analyzing the pros and cons of the ARRA, and by
comparing Korea’s administrative approach to adopting an economic stimulation plan in the real
market with the overall goal of narrowing the gap between legal policy and market reality.
The current economic problems are considered to have created the most serious global
economic crisis since the 1930s. President Roosevelt created the New Deal to alleviate the Great

1

See generally American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 3, 123 Stat. 115, 115-16
(2009) (Being intended “[t]o preserve and create jobs and promote economic recovery”; “assist those most impacted
by the recession”; “provide investments needed to increase economic efficiency”: “invest in transportation,
environmental protection, and other infrastructure that will provide long-term economic benefits”; and “stabilize
State and local government budgets, in order to minimize and avoid reductions in essential services and
counterproductive state and local tax increases.”)

2

See, e.g., Ben Bernanke, The Fed’s Exit Strategy, Op-ed, Wall St. J. L. (Jul. 21, 2009) (the Federal Reserve had
identified some positive signals of recovery with a policy package of so-called exit strategy, even though the market
still felt the suffering of recession),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203946904574300050657897992.html.
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Depression of the 1930’s. What role should the current government play in solving the current
economic situation?
The Congressional Budget Office’s announcement of economic indicators shows signs of
economic recovery in the U.S. 3 However, numerous mid-to-small sized companies and households
have not yet to see much relief. To identify the role of government, to find out the proper direction
of regulations, and to narrow down the government disengagement from the real market; this
research mainly will evaluate the assessment of the ARRA 2009. To accomplish the research, this
thesis will consist of five sections including the introduction as section I.
In section II, this paper I will present an historical analysis as one of the key assessment
tools. There is no more urgent time than now to reach for a new legal theory and scholarly agenda,
because neither simple legal doctrine nor simple economics will solve the grave problem facing
us. Thus, following the historical steps for the development of an economic depression will show
the strengths and weaknesses of the government’s approach regarding the regulations. By
addressing legal theoretical history and background, I will discuss the overall goal of this thesis in
determining the proper role for government to play.
In section III of this paper I will assess the ARRA. Specifically, I will look into the
legislative history4 of the ARRA to analyze the pros and cons of the Act and how the Democratic
and Republican Parties approached the Act 5 . The Obama administration insists that more
regulatory restrictions are needed to normalize the market, which has a theoretical basis in

3

Felix Reichling and Charles Whalen, Assessing the Short-Term Effects on Output of Changes in Federal Policies,
Congressional Budget Office Working Paper 2012-08 (May 2012).
4

2009 Legis. Bill Hist. US S.B. 1298.

5

155 CONG. REC. H 10436.
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Keynesian economic theory 6. Alternatively, the Republican view is that the government should
remove restrictions and let the market stand up by itself 7. The analysis between these opposing
sides of political and theoretical voices will support the ARRA and will show that the government
should have some power to control the market effectively.
In section IV of this paper I will compare the governments’ interpretation of different
stimulus Acts in the U.S. and South Korea. To study the lessons from the earlier Asian financial
crisis, research on Korea is significant because not only is Korea the only country that successfully
recovered from the late 1990s recession, but the Korean government also applied the stimulus Acts
differently, even though it used mainly the same economic stimulation approaches, such as
increasing government expenditure and reducing taxes. The Korean government included with
their stimulus spending specific orders to maintain control over the markets. Thus, the comparisons
will examine whether more government involvement in the ARRA encouraged further intrusion
of the ARRA 2009 into the real market. Also it includes a comparison of the government’s
economic stimulation regulatory methods in both the U.S. and South Korea. This comparison is
significant because legal trends tend to cycle over time between the world and legal institutions.
Also, analysis of economics and history is essential to understand law’s actual operation—its
failures and successes.

6

See. e.g., Jonatan Weisman & Jess Bravin, Obama’s Regulatory Czar Likely to Set a New Tone, Wall St. J. L. (Jul.
8, 2009) (President Obama appointed Cass Robert Sunstein, a self-designated new legal realist and proponent of the
incorporation of behavioral law and economic insights into policymaking, to head the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). OIRA is responsible for reviewing all agency draft regulations before they are published
to ensure that they comply with the President’s Executive Order for regulatory policymaking. It is very much in line
with Keynesian school of economic theory.), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123138051682263203.html.
7

See. Jeffrey Miron, Romney’s Economic Plan Has the Edge, CNN Online, (Oct. 18, 2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/18/opinion/miron-romney-economic-plan/index.html.
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In section V of this paper I will state my conclusion. I examine how government regulations
should apply in the real market, thus acquiring meaning and having effects through internal
business policies and procedures. Moreover, I will examine how these approaches suggest that we
shouldshape future stimulation acts more efficiently to provide a more realistic regulatory outcome
to stimulate economics effectively. In order to assess the role of law within the executive branch
under the economic recession, there must be a comprehensive review of major economic
stimulation acts and regulatory approaches that authorize the executive branch to exercise its
discretionary power. Then, such laws and regulations, as well as legal institutions, should be
transformed to a market-allocative and a rule-based legal system.

II. An Historical Inquiry, Comparison the Great Depression and Great
Recession

1. The Great Depression of the 1930’s

A. Historical Background and General Definition of the Great Depression

The 20th century’s most severe economic downturn was the Great Depression. The time
period of the Great Depression was varied to each country but most of world suffered a harsh

４

economic downturn during the 1930s through the middle 1940s.8 It also was the decade before
World War II.
There are various views about the start of the Great Depression, but the general consensus
is that the starting point was the U.S’s stock market meltdown. It was the origin of the Great
Depression and it created the worldwide stock market crash in late 1929. 9 For specific examples,
international trade decreased more than 50%, and U.S.’s unemployment rate rose up to 25%, while
other counties showed unemployment rates of more than 33%. 10 In the U.S., by 1933, the nations’
gross domestic product had dropped by a third. The seriousness of this economic calamity shook
the American people’s confidence in capitalism. 11 The following chart and table show the decrease
of the U.S. GDP and employment rates at that period of time.

8

See Generally John A. Garraty, The Great Depression (1986).

9

See. e.g., Depression & WWII (1929-1945), AMERICAS LIBRARY (Jan. 29, 2013, 10:05 PM) (the depression
originated in the U.S., after the fall in stock prices that began around September 4, 1929, and become worldwide
news with the stock market crash of October 29, 1929, that is known as Black Tuesday.),
http://www.americaslibrary.gov/jb/wwii/jb_wwii_subj.html.
10

ROBERT H. FRANK & BEN S. BERNANKE, PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS 98 (3rd ed. 2007).

11

See generally JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AGE OF UNCERTAINTY (1977); See also JOHN KENNETH
GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929 (1997).
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Figure 1. U.S.A annual GDP from 1910~1960 (The years of the Great Depression:1929~1939)12

12

CURRENTS OF CHANGE, ENGAGING SOCIAL STUDIES ACTIVITIES THAT MEET STATE CURRICULUM STANDARDS,
(Gross domestic product, or GDP, is the monetary value of all the goods and services produced by an economy
during a specific period, including consumption, government purchases, investments, and exports minus imports. In
the graph above, you can see how our GDP stalled during the Great Depression of the 1930s, then quickly increased
by the end of the decade, and continued to grow at a more steady pace up to 1960),
http://currentsofchange.net/map/annual-gdp/ (last visited Oct. 6. 2013).
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Figure 2. U.S.A’s unemployment rate (The years of the Great Depression:1929~1939) 13

B. The Causes of the Great Depression

1. Monetarist Theories

There are several views about the main causes of the Great Depression. Monetarist
economists insisted that the main causes were the U.S. Federal reserve’s failure to maintain the
money supply, and Britain’s returning to the gold standard. Meanwhile, economic historians

13

Id. See also STANLEY LEBERGOTT, THE MEASUREMENT AND BEHAVIOR OF UNEMPLOYMENT 215-216
(Universities-National Bureau ed., The National Bureau of Economic Research. 1957). The 1937 average was 7.7
million and the 1938, 10.4. Since November was at the end of a recession beginning in June, one would expect the
November figure to be somewhere between 7.7 and 10.4- perhaps about 9 million.
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insisted that the causes were both the structural weakness and specific events, such as major bank
failures and the U.S stock market’s devastating collapse on October 29, 1929. 14
The monetarists insist that the Federal Reserve’s failure of increase the money supply to
compensate for the collapse of the money supply caused by bank failures caused a reduction of the
money supply that exacerbated the economic situation, and it caused a recession to descend into
the Great Depression. For instance, the failure of the New York Bank of the United States that
produced the chain reaction of panic and widespread runs on local banks is one of examples that
shows the Federal Reserve’s failure of monetary policy. 15 The Federal Reserve allowed the large
public bank failure; they sat idly by while the banks collapsed. One of the monetarists Milton
Friedman also argued that, if the Federal Reserve had provided emergency lending to these key
banks, or simply bought government bonds on the open market to provide liquidity and increase
the quantity of money after the key banks fell, all the rest of the banks would not have fallen after
the large ones did, and the money supply would not have fallen as far and as fast as it did. 16
In addition, the timing issues of the regulation was one of the significant reasons why the
Federal Reserve could not limit the decline of the money supply. According to the information by
The American Presidency Project, at that time the amount of credit the Federal Reserve could issue
was limited by the Federal Reserve Act, which required 40% gold backing of Federal Reserve
Notes issued. 17 By the late 1920s, the Federal Reserve had almost hit the limit of allowable credit

14

See, e.g., David Kupelian, Bernanke: Federal Reserve caused Great Depression, WORLD NET DAILY (Mar. 19,
2008), http://www.wnd.com/2008/03/59405/.

15

Id. at 7.

16

PAUL KRUGMAN, FRIEDMAN AND SCHWARTS: MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 352 (2007); See
generally, PAUL KRUGMAN, WHO WAS MILTON FRIEDMAN (2008).

17

See generally FRANK B. FREIDEL, FRANLINE D. ROOSEVELT: LAUNCHING THE NEW DEAL, ch. 19 (1st ed.
1973).
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that could be backed by the gold in its possession. This credit was in the form of Federal Reserve
demand notes. 18 A “promise of gold” is not as good as “gold in the hand”, particularly when they
only had enough gold to cover 40% of the Federal Reserve Notes outstanding. 19 During the bank
panics a portion of those demand notes were redeemed for Federal Reserve gold. Since the Federal
Reserve had hit its limit on allowable credit, any reduction of gold in its vaults had to be
accompanied by a greater reduction in credit. On April 5, 1933, President Roosevelt signed
Executive Order 6201, making the private ownership of gold certificates, coins and bullion illegal,
reducing the pressure on Federal Reserve gold. 20
People normally believe that they could avoid further losses by keeping clear of the markets
when the panic of recession and deflation set in. For example, people thought that holding money
became profitable as prices dropped lower and a given amount of money bought ever more goods,
exacerbating the drop in demand.
Monetarist economists’ views are giving us answers with specific facts. These are microeconomic answers to the questions regarding the main causes of the Great Depression. The broad
version of the question is whether the Great Depression was caused by the failure of free markets
or by a failure of government’s improper policy adoptions, such as failure of efforts to regulate
interest rates, failure to curtail widespread bank failures, and failure to control the money supply.
If people are in favor of a larger economic role for the state, it can be find the primary reasons

18

Id.

19

Id.

20

Exec. Order No. 6102 (1933), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14611.
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from the failure of free markets. Also if people are in favor in smaller role for the state, they insist
that it was primarily a failure of government that compounded the problem.
Keynesian economist also was in favor for one of those main diverting points. As the
demand-driven theories mainly agreed, a large-scale loss of confidence led to a sudden reduction
in consumption and investment spending. In general, the Keynesians agree that the collapse of the
money supply lead to the Great Depression by decreasing aggregate demand and starting a
downward spiral on prices (further decreasing aggregate demand). The Keynesian solution is to
have the government under-take stimulus spending to increase aggregate demand. 21

2. Keynesian Theories
The Keynesian economic theories addressed by John Maynard Keynes in the book, The General
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. 22 It was published in 1936, which was the middle of
the Great Depression. 23According to the Keynesian economists, the public sectors needed to act
actively to respond to the private sector’s decisions that sometimes lead to inefficient
macroeconomic outcomes. In particular, fiscal policy actions by the government and monetary
policy actions by the central bank need to respond to the public in order to stabilize aggregate
demand for output over the business. 24

21

See generally JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY, (Paul
Krugman ed., Palgrave Macmillan 2007) (1936).

22

Id.

23

Alan S. Blinder, Keynesian Economics, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 316, 316-319, (David R.
Henderson ed., 2008).
24
ARTHUR O'SULLIVAN & STEVEN M. SHEFFRIN, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES IN ACTION, (2nd ed. 2003).
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The Keynesian’s solution to the problem was an aggressive government effort to revive
demand, an infusion of cash and private sector confidence. Saving had always been considered a
completely good thing, but under the economic recession what was needed was more spending.
However, when consumers and businesses were too broke or too scared to spend, the private sector
lost the power of consumption. The government would then have to be the spender of last resort.
Budget deficits always become a concern whenever governments expand their spending. However,
the Keynesian view on this concern is that when the private sector hunkered down and demand
dried up, the public sector needed to send more money in the economy than it took back in taxes.
Once consumers started spending again, businesses would hire more workers and make new
investments, and the virtuous cycle of economic growth could begin again anew. 25

C. Government Response: the United States

1. Under President Hoover

Initial government reactions to the crisis were minimal or even counterproductive.
President Hoover argued that the nation’s problems could be solved through “belt-tightening” and
cutting government spending. 26 These measures of course just further decreased aggregate demand
and made the recession worse.

25
LAWRENCE R. KLEIN, THE KEYNESIAN REVOLUTION 56–58, 169, 177–79 (1947); THEODORE ROSENOF,
ECONOMICS IN THE LONG RUN: NEW DEAL THEORISTS AND THEIR LEGACIES, 1933–1993 ??? (1997).
26

KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., LABOR LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORKPLACE ??? (2009

１１

However, the Hoover Administration had to change their thinking when the economic
recession became more serious than they thought. Hoping to recover from the economic recession,
President Hoover adopted several governmental programs, even though their all programs were
failed to overcome in the early stages of the Great Depression. One of the programs was the SmootHawley Tariff Act.27 According to information from U.S. Department of State, the Smoot-Hawley
Tariff Act of June 1930 increased U.S. tariffs to historically high levels. 28 The increasing strength
of the protection that would be afforded domestic farmers against agricultural imports was the
original intention behind the legislation. 29 During the 1920s, massive agricultural overproduction
was made by the massive expansion in the agricultural production sector outside of Europe during
World War I. 30 As a result of this massive production, the agricultural products’ prices declined
during the second half of the decade. Herbert Hoover pledged to help the beleaguered farmer by
raising tariff levels on agricultural products in the 1928 election campaign. 31 However, once the
tariff schedule revision process got started, it proved impossible to stop. Calls for increased
protection flooded in from industrial sector special interest groups, and soon a bill meant to provide
relief for farmers became a means to raise tariffs in all sectors of the economy. When the dust had
settled, Congress had agreed to tariff levels that exceeded the already high rates established by the
1922 Fordney-McCumber Act and represented among the most protectionist tariffs in U.S.
history. 32

Contrary to the U.S government’s intent, the result of the Smoot-Howley Tariff

27

19 U.S.C. § 1654 (1930).

28

Id.

29

Id.

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

Id.
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Act was that other countries increased their tariffs against the United States which led to decreased
international trade. As a result, it made the Depression worse. Thus, it became one of major failures
of government response to the Great Depression.
The Hoover Administration also adopted the Emergency Relief and Construction Act that
became a final attempt to recover from the recession under President Hoover. 33 The Emergency
Relief and Construction Act mainly expanded government spending with public construction
programs such as building dams. Along with the Act, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
(RFC) was created in 1932. 34 The purpose of the RFC was providing governmental money to
sectors that suffered economic hardship. For instance, it included financial institutions, railroads,
and farmers. Despite applying for several governmental programs, the Great Depression could not
be overturned. 35 In the Keynesian view, the government spending policies made under President
Hoover were not enough in terms of scale and amount for the national economy to recover from
the Great Depression. More aggressive measures consistent with Keynesian economic theory were
undertaken to end the Great Depression by the Roosevelt administration. The following chapter
will discuss the different approach made by the Roosevelt Administration that adopt Keynesian’s
economic theories to play the stimulation policy.

2. President Roosevelt and the Rise of Keynesian Economic Theory

33

See generally TEXT OF EMERGENCY RELIEF AND CONSTRUCTION ACT OF 1932—H. R. 9642, 24 J. Am. Water
Works Assoc. 1208, 1208-1230 (1932).

34

Id. at 1208.

35

Id.
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Under the Roosevelt Administration, one of the most famous economic stimulation policies
applied to recover from the recession was the New Deal. New Deal programs tried to stimulate
demand, increase jobs, and provide relief for the impoverished. To achieve those goals, the U.S.
government increased its spending and took decisive action, such as financial reforms of
institutions, along with adopting Keynesian’s economic theory.
During times of economic crisis, Keynesian economists called on governments to pick up
the slack by increasing government spending and cutting taxes. Keynesian’s basic idea was simple:
to keep people fully employed, governments have to run deficits when the economy is slowing, as
the private sector would not invest enough to keep production at the normal level and bring the
economy out of recession. As the Depression wore on, Roosevelt tried public works, farm
subsidies, and other devices to restart the US economy, but never completely gave up trying to
balance the budget. According to the Keynesian theorists, this improved the economy, but the
economy was not out of the recession until the start of World War II. 36
The spending by the Roosevelt Administration was much increased from spending under
the Hoover government, but the Keynesian theorists still criticized that the spending was not
enough to bring out America from the recession. However, World War II was the turning point
from the economic downturn, which is a common view among economists.

37

World War II

became an external fact to accelerate government spending in keeping with Keynesian’s claims

36

See also supra p.1225

37

Id.
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that government should expand the spending to overcome the recession. 38 The United States’ entry
into the war in 1941 finally eliminated the last effects from the Great Depression and brought the
U.S. unemployment rate down below 10%. 39 In the U.S., massive war spending doubled economic
growth rates, either masking the effects of the Depression or essentially ending the Depression. 40
Thus, World War II made the government expand spending and aggregate demand. Along with
this, another view is that conventional aggregate demand stimulus did not matter in the recovery
from the Great Depression. Bernanke and Parkinson (1989) analyze the apparent trend reversion
of employment in the 1930s and are struck by the strength of the recovery. 41 They argue, however,
that the “New Deal is better characterized as having cleared the way for a natural recovery… rather
than as being the engine of recovery itself.” 42 They suggest that the trend reversion of the interwar
economy is evidence of a strong self-corrective force. 43
There is no consensus among economists regarding the motivating force for the U.S.
economic expansion that continued through most of the Roosevelt years. The common view
among many economists is that Roosevelt’s New Deal policies either caused or accelerated the

38

But see WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL: 1932-1940 171, 245–6
(Harper Perennial 2009) (1963); HERBERT STEIN, PRESIDENTIAL ECONOMICS: THE MAKING OF ECONOMIC POLICY
FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN AND BEYOND (Simon & Schuster 1984) (New Dealers never accepted the Keynesian
argument for government spending as a vehicle for recovery. Most economists of the era, along with Henry
Morgenthau of the Treasury Department, rejected Keynesian solutions and favored balanced budgets.).
39

See generally The Great Depression and World War II (1929 - 1945), THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Jan. 19,
2013), http://www.loc.gov/teachers/additionalresources/relatedresources/ushist/chrono/depressi.html.
40

Id.

41
Ben Bernanke & Martin Parkinson, Unemployment, Inflation, and Wages in the American Depression: Are There
Lessons for Europe?, 79(2) AER P&P 210, 210-214 (1989).
42

Id.

43

Id.
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recovery, although his policies were never aggressive enough to bring the economy completely
out of recession. 44
In particular, various initiatives were started by President Roosevelt under the “New Deal”
in 1933 to create jobs and stimulate demand. The key initiatives were as follows. First was the
creation of the Civilian Conservative Corps to provide work for men aged 18-35 using camps run
by the War Department. 45 Second, the government created programs within the Agriculture and
Interior Department for preservation of the nation’s crops and forests. 46 Third, it created the
Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA),which provided grants to states, and the Public
Works Administration with a budget of $3.3 billion (approximately 6% of GDO) to provide
funding to local governments for public projects. Another new agency, the Civil Works
Administration (CWA) was created in 1934, which would bypass state officials and employ people
directly. 47 The CWA workers were used to fix up city halls, docks, and public roads, all on the
federal government’s payroll. Finally, the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act gave the President
about $5 billion for relief projects including highways, conservation, irrigation, electrification,
housing, sanitation, reforestation, flood control and indeed any conceivable public good. Roosevelt
used the act to set up the Works Progress Administration (WPA), which took over from FERA.48

44

See generally Gauti B. Eggertsson, Great Expectations and the End of the Depression, 98(4) AER 1476, 14761516 (2008); Gauti B. Eggertsson, Was the New Deal Contractionary?, FRBNY Staff Report No. 264 (2006); See
also Gauti B. Eggertsson & Benjamin W. Pugsley, The Mistake of 1937: A General Equilibrium Analysis, CFS
Working Paper No. 2007/06 (2006).
45
46

Antonio Spilimbergo et al., Fiscal Policy for the Crisis, IMF Staff Position Note No. 2008/01, at 22 (2008).
Id.

47

Id. at 23.

48

Id.
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The WPA spent money directly from the national treasury, and hired workers to build hospitals,
schools, playgrounds, and airports. The program drew criticism for spending public money to pay
idle hands to do unproductive work. 49
The tax revenues, however, kept pace with the rising expenditures during the 1930s. The
Revenue Act of 1932 pushed up tax rates virtually across the board, but notably for the low and
middle-income groups. Some of the changes brought about by the law. First, personal income tax
exemptions were slashed and the normal tax, as well as surtax rates, was sharply raised. Second,
earned-income credit equal to 25 percent of taxes on low incomes was repealed. Third, corporate
tax rate was raised slightly, exemptions sharply reduced, and a gift tax was provided. Fourth, a
broad new list of excise taxes was introduced and substantially higher rates were established for
the old ones. Lastly, processing taxes were introduced later in the 30s, and social security taxes
began in 1937.50
In addition, under the Roosevelt administration, there was one more contributing policy
that stabilized the money supply and increased consumer confidence, and it was the Banking Act
of 1935. 51 The Banking Act of 1935 effectively raised reserve requirements, restricted banking
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investments and provided for federal deposit insurance. These changes shored up the U.S. banking
system preventing further bank failures and collapse of the money supply. 52

2. The Great Recession of 2008

A. History and General Definition

The recent global economic recession, the most severe since the Great Depression, is
generally called the “Great Recession.” However it is controversial whether it deserves the name
of the Great Recession, capital ‘G’ and capital ‘R’, an obvious allusion to the Great Depression.
Larry Summers, who was the President’s economic adviser, thinks that it deserves the name ‘Great
Recession’, and President Obama uses the words and the Associated Press has actually changed
its stylebook and now uses the proper noun to describe the recession. Even though unemployment
raised more in this recession than it did in any other previous recession since the Great Depression,
there’s still an argument among economists over whether to use the term ‘Great Recession.’’ 53
According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. NBER, the duration of the
Great Recession was from end of 2007 to middle of 2009. The NBER does not define a recession
in terms of two consecutive quarters of decline in real GDP. Rather, a recession is a significant
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decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally
visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales.54
Several factors caused the recession, such as bad financial situations and increasing price in oil
and food. Among the several causes, the sub-prime mortgage and the global real estate bubble are
the most significant trigger. On September 2008, with the failure of Leman Brothers, the U.S.
reached the peak of its economic meltdown.
The Great Recession is significant not only in because of the depth and duration of the
economic decline, but also because it affected all aspects of society. For example the Great
Recession has affected the way government deals with the economy, the shape of finance, the new
rules of the road for finance, and etc.

B. Government Intervention

The Recession led to emergency interventions in many national financial systems. As the
crisis developed into a genuine recession in many major economies, economic stimulus meant to
revive economic growth became the most common policy tool. After having implemented rescue
plans for the banking system, major developed and emerging countries announced plans to revive
their economies using stimulus spending or tax cuts. In particular, economic stimulus plans were
announced in Asia and the Americas. 55
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The U.S. government implemented several rescue policies designed to stimulate the
economy consistent with Keynesian economic theory. For instance, the Obama administration that
took over the government during the peak period of the recession applied the huge government
spending policy such as ARRA and expanded the amount of the budget than was planned in the
previous administration. Specifically, the Federal Reserve, Treasury, and Securities and Exchange
Commission took several steps to intervene in the crisis. To stop the potential run on money market
mutual funds, the Treasury also announced on September 19 a new $50 billion program to insure
the investments, similar to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) program. 56 Part of
the announcements included temporary exceptions to section 23A 57 and 23B 58 (Regulation W),
allowing financial groups to more easily share funds within their group.
For instance, The Federal Reserve Board approved two interim final rules in connection
with its initiative to provide liquidity to markets by extending loans to banking organizations to
finance their purchases of high-quality asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) from money
market mutual funds. The first interim final rule would provide a temporary limited exception from
the Board's leverage and risk-based capital rules for bank holding companies and state member
banks. The second would provide a temporary limited exception from sections 23A and 23B of
the Federal Reserve Act, which establish certain restrictions on and requirements for transactions
between a bank and its affiliates. 59 The interim final rules approved by the Board were designed
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to facilitate participation by depository institutions and bank holding companies in this special
lending program as intermediaries between the Federal Reserve and money market mutual funds. 60
The Securities and Exchange Commission announced termination of short-selling of 799 financial
stocks, as well as action against naked short selling, as part of its reaction to the mortgage crisis.61
In May 2013 as the stock market was hitting record highs and the housing and employment markets
were improving slightly the prospect of the Federal Reserve beginning to decrease its economic
stimulus activities began to enter the projections of investment analysts and affected global
markets. 62
The Recovery Act attempted to boost aggregate demand and jobs at a time when the
American economy was hemorrhaging over 700,000 jobs a month. 63 The leading independent
economic forecasters-firms like Macroeconomic Advisers, Moody’s Economy.com, HIS Global
Insights, J.P. Morgan Chase, and Goldman Sachs, as well as the Congress Budget Office-all agree
that the stimulus helped stop the economic crisis and ending the peak point of the recession. 64 Of
course, the Recovery Act was not the only government intervention that helped stabilize the
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economy. The Federal Reserve’s emergency support for the financial sector, administrative rescue
plan of the auto industry, and the even controversial Wall Street bailout that began under Bush
administrative all helped keep it out from the recession. 65
The Recovery Act was supported by Keynesian economic theories that urged policymakers
to expand government spending during the economic downturns, to offset the decrease of private
sector demand. When the Obama administration took over the government, the economic situation
was literally a nightmare, such as credit was frozen, consumer confidence the lowest ever recorded,
and the economy was shrinking at rate of 8.9 percent.66 Under the nightmare, the Recovery Act
lifted the economic situations with Keynesian theories: tax breaks for business and families to get
cash circulating again; bailouts of employees; one-time handouts to seniors, veterans, and the
disabled; generous expansions of unemployment benefits, food stamps, health insurance, and other
assistance for struggling families. 67 The stimulus also put people to work directly with over
100,000 projects to upgrade roads, bridges, subways, water pipes, sewer plants, bus stations, fire
stations, the Joseph R. Biden Jr. Railroad Station in Wilmington, Delaware, federal buildings,
Grand Canyon National Park, trails, libraries, court houses, and much more. Many independent
analysts insist the Recovery Act was saving or creating jobs upon its goal that was at least 3 million
jobs in the short term. Although president Obama joked about the saving or creating at his annual
Thanksgiving pardon that he just saved and created four turkeys, it is not deniable that the
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Recovery Act saved at least 3 million people from unemployment. 68 Also, the CBO data showed
that the Recovery Act increased output over 2 percent, the difference between growth and
contraction. 69

III. Assessment of the ARRA 2009

1. General scope of the Acts

A. The general introduction of the ARRA

In response to the Great Recession, affected nations have created and set in motion various
economic stimulus plans.

Each government has the same basic tools, such as extending

government spending and reducing taxes, in response to the recession. However, the result was
varied for each country enacting said basic tools. The results, both intended and unintended, were
affected significantly by 1) way of using available political tools, 2) the player’s economic
methodologies, and 3) the government's rationale for utilizing those economic tools.
The majority of economists state that the great recession began with economic decline in
December 2007, with the most significant downturn occurring in September 2008. The global
68
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economic downturn affected many nations but its triggers varied by nation and its effects were
certainly not suffered equally. For the U.S., the sudden downturn of the U.S. subprime mortgage
market was one of major triggers for the great recession. Further, the collapse of the subprime
mortgage market was the epicenter of the financial crisis of 2007~2008. In response to the great
recession, the U.S. government enacted American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
(ARRA) in the session of 111th United States Congress. 70
Though President Obama is given credit for enacting the ARRA into law, the actual
planning and drafting of the bills began prior to his inauguration on January 20th, 2009. The
approximate cost of the bills was estimated to be $787 billion at the time of passage created, but it
extended to $831 billion by the later revising by Obama's administration. 71 Obama administration
released a report to support the expanding and to justify their methodologies for running of the
economic stimulation plan on January 10th, 2009. 72 According to the report, “The job of The
American Recovery and Reinvestment Plan”, by Christina Romer, and Jared Bernstein, the saving
and creating of at least three million jobs was one of main goals for the Obama administration.73
The report supported not only the methodology that justify the extension of the ARRA, but also
discuss how to make tax cuts, fiscal relief to the states, and increase the spending of infrastructures.
In the end, the final version of the ARRA enacted by the 111th United State Congress in February
2009 and signed into law on February 17, 2009, by President Barack Obama. 74
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The goals of ARRA are expressly stated in Section 3 of the Act:
"1. To preserve and create jobs, and to promote economic recovery
2. To assist those most impacted by the recession
3. To provide investment needed to increase economic efficiency by spurring
technological advances in science and health
4. To invest in transportation, environmental protection, and other infrastructure that
will provide long-term economic benefits
5. To stabilize State and local government budgets, in order to minimize and avoid
reductions in essential services and counterproductive state and local tax
increases." 75

The Act specifies that 37% of the package be devoted to tax incentives equaling $288 billion
and 18% of funds, equaling $144 billion (need to correct), be allocated to state and local fiscal
relief (with more than 90% of the $144 billion dedicated to states medical aid and education
expenditures). 76 The remaining 45%, representing $357 billion, was allocated to federal spending
programs such as transportation, communication, waste water and sewer infrastructure
improvement, energy efficiency upgrades in private and federal building, extension of federal
unemployment benefits, and scientific research programs. 77
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B. The Scale of the ARRA

The ARRA’s total $831 billion budget was enacted with a specified distribution. 78 First,
the total tax incentives is $288 billion, of which $237 billion was dedicated to individual tax
incentives 79 and the remaining $51 billion set-aside for non-individual tax incentives (such as
business entities other than sole proprietors). 80 Second, the ARRA included the enactment of the
Health Information Technology for economic and Clinical Health Act, also known as the HITECH
Act (The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act) that included
$155.1 billion for total health care spending. 81 Also, the Acts included $100 billion for educationbased spending, as well as $82.2 billion for aid to low income workers, unemployed and retirees
that was included under job training. 82 The total $105.3 billion infrastructure investment spending
was distributed as follows: $48.1 billion for transportation; $18 billion for water, sewage,
environment, and public lands; $7.2 billion for government building and facilitates; $10.5 billion
for communications, information and security technologies; and $21.5 billion to energy
infrastructure. 83 Moreover, $27.2 billion were allocated to energy efficiency and renewable energy
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research and investment and $14.7 billion to housing spending.84 Lastly, $7.6 billion from the total
spending was contributed to scientific research, and $10.6 billion to category of other items. 85

C. The Buy American Provision

To protect its own market, the ARRA introduced the ”Buy American Provision.” 86 This
provision forcefully imposed a general requirement that any public building or public works
project funded by the ARRA must utilize iron, steel and other manufactured goods produced in
the U.S. 87 This clause caused several controversies, such as international trade conflicts as this
clause by its nature is discriminatory and conflicted with free trade agreements already in effect.

D. Recovery.gov as the transparency matter

The Obama administration defined clearly that the economic stimulus plan would provide
unprecedented transparency for government acts from the early stages of the ARRA. The purpose
of such transparency was to demonstrate to the American public how funds were spent by
recipients of contracts, grants, and loans, as well as report the distribution of stimulus entitlements
and tax benefits. The vehicle by which the Obama administration delivered and reported this
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governmental transparency was released to the American public soon after; the Recovery.gov
website debuted on February 17th 2009. 88
In line with its transparency efforts, the US government also required the following
controls and methods of evaluation:
"1. Federal agencies are required to report weekly on how they are distributing the
funds,
2. Recipients of contract, grant, and loan awards Recovery funds (state/local
governments, universities and other research institutions, non-profit
organizations, private companies) are required to report every January, April,
June, and October on how they are spending the funds and the number of jobs
funded by Recovery,
3. All the information from both agencies and recipients is to be posted on
Recovery.gov, which is managed by the Recovery Accountability and
Transparency Board." 89
In addition, the ARRA required the ‘Recovery Board’ that is called “The Recovery
Accountability and Transparency Board”. It is an agency of the United States federal government,
which manages the Recovery.gov website and oversees spending under the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009. It is created to manage a websites to foster greater accountability
and transparency in the use of funds made available in this Act.90 The two major sources of all the
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data that provide on the site are Weekly Financial Reports by federal agencies and the reports
submitted by the recipients themselves at FederalReposting.gov. The Board also manages both
resources, and none of the data is changed, altered, or corrected by the Board prior to posting.

2. Legislative history

A. Comparison of the Bill

The House version of the bill was introduced on January 26th 2009. 91 In the early state of
the bill, there were 206-sheduled amendments for floor votes. However, they were combined into
11 amendments in later for quicker passage of the bill. 92 The senate version of the bill was
introduced on January 6th, 2009, and it was changed later to the amendment of the House version.
The significant changes between the House and the senate were the inclusion that was one-year
extension of the bill’s total. The following chart is the main difference of spending for each
division between senate and the House.

Bill Summary & Status 111th Congress (2009 – 2010) H.R.1, The Library of Congress (Jan. 26, 2009), U.S. Senate
Roll Call Votes 111th Congress - 1st Session, United States Senate (Feb. 9, 2009),
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote
=00059.
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Figure 3. The different amount of spending between the Senate and the House 93

B. The different views of Republicans and Democrats

Republicans had a different view on the economic stimulus policies. Compared with the
Democrats’ view on the economic stimulation policies, Republicans were in favor of increasing
the share of tax cuts, downsizing spending, and decreasing the overall size of the stimulus
package. 94 The Democrats’ view on the economic stimulus policies were supported by the
rationales that were from Keynesian macroeconomic theory. Under this rationale the government
should offset the decrease in private spending with an increase in public spending in order to
maintain aggregate demand, save jobs and stop further economic deterioration.
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To reduce the gap between both parties, president Obama and the Senate Democrats
adopted some of Republicans’ suggested amendments such as the increasing infrastructure
spending and doubling the housing tax credit proposed from $7,500 to $15,000 and expanding its
application to all home buyers, not just the first time home owner. 95 As a result, the Senate floor
to vote in the bill itself. Finally, on February 10th, the Senate voted 61 vs. 37 that all democrats
voted to pass the bill.96

3. The Competing Claims on the ARRA

As I mentioned briefly in the previous chapter, both the Democratic and Republican parties
had a different view on the ARRA as well as the supporting economic theories for the bill.
Understanding each parties’ position on the ARRA is crucial to understanding the bill. Because it
becomes a cornerstone to make a public policy and law making process, and it is not except of
economic stimulation plans.

A. The Democrats’ side

Democrats insisted that larger economic stimulation was needed to recover from the
economic downturn. Also economists such as Joseph Stiglitz, the winner of Nobel Memorial Prize
in Economic Science, and Larry Summers, National Economic Council director, agreed with the
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need for substantial economic stimulus. Moreover, Martin Feldstein, the George F. Baker
Professor of Economics at Harvard University, and the president emeritus of the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER), addressed his concern over the ARRA that the Act needed
revision to address consumer spending and unemployment more directly. 97 Also, Paul Krugman,
Professor of Economics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Centnary Professor at
the London School of Economics, and winner of Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences,
insist that even the Democrats’ view on the stimulus was too small to effectively combat the
recession. In the N.Y Times article, he addressed that it’s widely believed that political
considerations led to a plan that was weaker and contains more tax cuts than it should have that
Mr. Obama compromised in advance in the hope of gaining broad bipartisan support. 98

B. The Republicans’ side

Some of Republican was alarmed the election of Barack Obama and a largely Democratic
Congress from the very first stage of their governing. Because they expected that the Obama
administration would be oriented toward bigger government that is significantly favored variety
of programs with the increasing size of government.
To contradict President Obama’s January 9th announcement, which is “There is no
disagreement that we need action by our government, a recovery plan that will help to jumpstart
the economy.” 200 economists expressly addressed their opposing view for the Obama
administration’s policy on January 28, 2009. They publicized full-page advertisement in New
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York Times and Wall Street Journal: Notwithstanding reports that all economists are now
Keynesians and we all support a big increase in the burden of government, we the undersigned do
not believe that more government spending is a way to improve economic performance. More
government spending by Hoover and Roosevelt did not pull the United State economy out of the
Great Depression in the 1930s. More government spending did not solve Japan’s “Lost Decades”
in the 1990s. As such, it is U.S. Today. To improve the economy, policymakers should focus on
reforms that remove pediments to work, saving investment and production. Lower tax rates and a
reduction in the burden of government are the best ways of using fiscal policy to boost growth. In
short, those 200 economists insisted that larger stimulation will be the burden to government, so
the best way to apply stimulus plans are reduction of tax rates, and to focus on reforms that remove
impediments to work, saving and decreasing the overall price.

Thus, they are in the same line

with Republican’s opinion that is consisted with increasing the share of tax cuts, downsizing
spending, and decreasing the overall price.

C. Other Opinions

As I mentioned previously, some of economists argued the stimulation plan is not big
enough to recover the current recession. First, in July 18, 2010, sixteen notable economists and
historians have joined in a consensus statement for The Daily Beast demanding urgent action on
unemployment and the faltering recovery. 99
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They addressed their recognition of the necessity of a program to cut the mid-and longterm federal deficit. They also point out the historical lessons from the 1930s that the economy
was suffered a harsh decline in aggregate demand and loss of business confidence. Thus, they
insist that monetary policy may not enough, particularly in deep slumps, as Keynes noted. The
urgent need is for government to replace the lost purchasing power of the unemployed and their
families and to employ other tax-cut and spending programs to boost demand. Making deficit
reduction the first target, without addressing the chronic underlying deficiency of demand. Is
exactly the error of the 1930s. it will prolong the great recession, harm the social cohesion of the
country, and continue inflicting unnecessary hardship on millions of Americans.
In addition, with twenty-four more economists joining, including two Nobel Prize winners,
a group of 40 prominent economists criticized the stimulation plan in a statement in July 2010. 100
Everett Ehrlich, former Undersecretary of Commerce and Chief Economist of Unisys
Corporation, who is one of those 40, mentioned that economic policy under the Obama
Administration has succeeded in averting the most stunning economic implosion since the Great
Depression. And it almost succeeded in setting a sustained recovery in motion. But just at the point
when self-sustaining growth was about to take hold, the world was buffeted by a new crisis in the
Eurozone, which confronted the economy with new uncertainty and stifled growth. Economists
are right to worry about the growth in federal debt. Hopefully, their rectitude will persist into 2012
and 2013, when deficit reduction will be of growing importance. But, for the moment, the
economy’s primary need is additional stimulations, not fiscal contraction. The examples of overstimulus during economic crises are few if any. Moreover, the primary danger of over-stimulation,
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inflation, is far from a realistic concern- the real threat is deflation, which favors deferring demand
and investment. And if the overhang of federal debt were an active (as opposed to prospective)
concern, the interest rate on 10 years government bonds would be substantially in excess of the
current and partly 2.6 percent. The economy is primed for growth. Banks hold over a trillion in
non-borrowed reserve. Corporations have accumulated $1.8 trillion in cash. But a spark is needed
to turn this kindling into a fire. Only government can do this –stimulation will never be more
appropriate nor prospectively productive than it is now. We should extend employer Social
Security tax reduction, provide more aid to the states and localities, commit to a long-term program
of public infrastructure investment, and use the Fed’s balance sheet to buy small business loans
from banks if they will absorb the first 10~ 15 percent of possible loss.

4. The estimated impact of the ARRA

A. The first forecast report by the Congressional Budget Office

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) foresaw the outcomes of the stimulus plan that
would increase GDP relative to the agency’s baseline forecast by between 1.2 percent and 3.6
percent by the end of 2010. 101 The CBO also estimated the increasing of employment by 1.3
million to 3.9 million jobs by the end of 2010. 102 In the end of 2010, the unemployment rate would
be 0.7 percentage point to 2.1 percentage points lower than the baseline forecast of 8.7 percent.
The effects of the legislation would diminish rapidly after 2010. 103 By the end of 2011, the
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stimulation plan foresaw that it would increase GDP by 0.4 percent to 1.2 percent, would raise
employment by 0.6 million to 1.9 million jobs, and would lower the unemployment rate by 0.3
percentage points to 1.0 percentage point. 104
The CBO also analyzed the relationship between output and employment. It derived its
estimate of the Act on employment from the estimated effect on GDP. The CBO also adopted the
historical evidence that 1 percentage point faster over a year GDP growth (”relative to a baseline
forecast”) would cause the unemployment rate to decline by a little more than half a percentage
point (“relative to a corresponding baseline forecast”). Moreover, the CBO argued that the fall in
the unemployment rate leads more people to enter the labor force and seek jobs and fewer to drop
out. Therefore, employment rises both from a decline in the number of unemployed workers and
a decline in the number of people of the labor force. In addition, some workers otherwise working
part time move to full-time status.105
Thus, the CBO estimated the result from the stimulation plan would increase economic
outputs and employment in the short run. In addition, including the effects of both crowding out
of private investment (“which would reduce output in the long run”) and possibly productive
government investment (”which could increase output”), the CBO estimates that by 2019 the Act
would reduce GDP by 0.1 percent to 0.3 percent on net. 106 In the long run, the ARRA would reduce
the output slightly by increasing the government’s debts and decreasing supply of private
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investment. However, it would be offset by other factors, such as increased spending for basic
research and education, and improvements to roads and highways. 107

B. Direct and Indirect Impacts

The CBO used various economic models and historical data to guide its estimate of the
way in which output and employment are affected by increases in outlays and reductions in
revenues under ARRA. The CBO’s assessment is that different elements of ARRA have had
different effects on economic output per dollar of higher spending or lower tax receipts.
Multiplying estimates of those per-dollar effects by the dollar amount of each element of ARRA
yields an estimate of the law’s total impact on output.
The CBO used evidence from models and historical relationships to determine direct and
indirect effects in ARRA. Direct effect consists of immediate effects on economic activity.
Government purchases of goods and services directly add to the nation’s output, dollar for dollar.
For reductions in taxes, increases in transfer payments, and increases in aid to state and local
governments, the size of the direct effect depends on the policy’s direct impact on the behavior of
recipients.
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The CBO reviewed evidence on the responses of households, businesses, and governments
to various types of tax cuts and transfer payments to estimate the size of those policies’ direct
effects on output. 108
Government policies also can have indirect effects that enhance or offset the direct effects.
Direct effects are enhanced when, for example, a government policy creates jobs and those who
are hired use their income to boost consumption. Direct effects also are enhanced when greater
demand for goods and services prompts companies to increase investment to bolster their future
production.

C. The ARRA’s long-term effects and concern about the debt

In contrast to its positive macroeconomic effects, ARRA will reduce output slightly in the
long run, CBO estimates- by between 0 and 0.2 percent after 2016. But CBO expects that the
legislation will have no long-term effects on employment because the U.S. economy will have a
high rate of use its labor resources in the long run. 109
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ARRA’s long-run impact on the economy stems primarily from the resulting increase in
government debt. To the extent that people hold their wealth in government securities rather than
in a form that can be used to finance private investment, the increased debt tends to reduce the
stock of productive private capital. In the long run, each dollar of additional debts crowns out about
a third of a dollar’s worth of private domestic capital, CBO estimates. (The remainder of the rise
in debt is offset by increases in private saving and inflows of foreign capital.) Because of
uncertainty about the degree of crowding out, however, CBO’s range of estimates of ARRA’s long
run effects reflects the possibility that the extent of crowding out could be more or less than onethird of the added debt.
Over the long term, the output of the economy depends on the stock of productive capital,
the supply of labor, and productivity. The less productive capital there is as a result of lower private
investment, the smaller will be the nation’s output over the long run. The effect of the crowding
out of some private investment under ARRA will be offset somewhat by other factors. Some of
ARRA’s provisions, including its funding for roads and highways, may add to the economy’s
potential output in much the same way that private capital investment does. Others, including its
funding of education, may raise long-term productivity by enhancing people’s skills. Still other
provisions create incentives for increased private investment.

D. The advantage and disadvantage of CBO’s model-based approach

A key advantage of the model-based approach used in this analysis is the ability to provide
estimates of the total effects throughout the economy of the government spending, transfer
３９

payments, and tax cuts resulting from ARRA. By focusing on the net change in employment, that
approach captures both the jobs created and the jobs retained as a result of ARRA.
Another key disadvantage of the model-based approach is the considerable uncertainty
about many of the economic relationships that are important in the modeling. Because economists
differ on which analytical approaches provide the most convincing evidence about such
relationships, they can reach different conclusions about those relation- ships. In addition, each
study involves uncertainty about the extent to which the results reflect the true effects of a given
policy or the effects of other factors. For those reasons, CBO provides ranges of estimates of
ARRA’s economic effects that are intended to encompass most economists’ views and thereby
reflect the uncertainty involved in such estimates.

E. Results

CBO estimates that ARRA’s policies had the following effects in the fourth quarter of
calendar year 2011: first, they raised real gross domestic product by between 0.2 percent and 1.5
percent, second, they lowered the unemployment rate by between 0.2 percentage point and 1.1
percentage points, third, they increased the number of people employed by between 0.3 million
and 2.0 million, and fourth, they increased the number of full-time –equivalent jobs by 0.4 million
to 2.6 million. 110

110

RA & TB, Supra note 71.

４０

The effects of ARRA on output peaked in the first half of 2010 and have since diminished.
The effects of ARRA on employment are estimated to lag slightly behind the effects on output.
The employment effects began to wane at the end of 2010 and continued to do so throughout 2011.
ARRA raised real GDP in 2012 by between 0.1 percent and 0.8 percent and will increase the
number of people employed in 2012 by between 0.2 million and 1.1 million. Also, CBO estimate
that short-term interest rates will stay close to zero through 2013 and raise only slightly in 2014.111
In addition, 213,094 full-time-equivalent jobs were funded by ARRA during the fourth quarter in
2011. 112

IV. The Predictable Problem and Learning from Korea

1. The Predictable Problem: Budget deficits

Generally, economic downturns tend to increase the national debt that is from both a
reduction in revenues and an increase in social spending. Moreover, during the Great Recession
America spent a huge amount of money to recover from this economic meltdown, including the
ARRA. The current U.S. national debt is $17.5 Trillion in Gross Government Debt and $12.5
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trillion in Net Government Debt which excludes intergovernmental debt such as debt owed to the
Social Security Trust Fund. At the end of 2013, gross government debt was 101% of GDP while
debt held by the public represented about 72% of GDP.113

History of the U.S.A public debt, source by Congressional Budget Office 114
Thus, the question is at what point are debt levels high enough to cause investors to demand
significantly higher interest rates and a fiscal crises ensues? Countries with high debt relative to
GDP cannot be complacent, even if they currently face low sovereign interest rates. Such countries
are always vulnerable to an adverse feedback loop in which high debt loads, culminating in a
tipping point 115 in which the interest rate shoots up. 116 According to the Gladwell, based on an
analysis of 20 countries, he insists 80% of GDP is the serious point as long as the country is running
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a persistent deficit.117 Also, some Economisst think that debt above 90% of GDP lead to a decline
in economic growth. 118 When we applied to the US and using CBO projections, the US will hit
this 80% in 2024. 119 However, this is based only on publicly held debt and the gross debt-to-GDP
is already over this threshold point. Thus, the expansion of spending, such as ARRA, should not
be the only solution to recover current economic recession.

Figure 4. Federal Debt Held by the Public (percentage of gross domestic product) 120

2. Korea Economic Crisis in 1997 and Government’s Approach for the Crisis
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In late 1997, Korean banks could not roll over short-term loans, despite the announced
government guarantees for foreign debt. In addition, the Japanese banks, which were suffering
from their growing non-performing loans, withdrew a large percentage of their loans.121 The
inability to roll over foreign loans triggered runs on the currency and the Korean won depreciated
25% in late November from its pre-crisis level. Currency market intervention left Korea with less
than $6 billion USD in usable foreign exchange reserves in December.
By early 1998, most commercial banks and other financial institutions in Korea were
technically in default due to the severe depreciation and high interest rates. The twin crisis (BOP
and the financial sector) together with tight monetary policy led to a severe recession with real
GDP shrinking by 8.4 percent in the third quarter of 1998 compared with the same quarter in the
previous year.

Foreign loans to Korea by Japanese financial institutions dropped from USD22 billion at the end of 1996 to USD9
billion by the end of 1997.
121
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Figure
5. Debt-to-equity ratio for the manufacturing sector in Korea, Japan, and the US, 1995-2002 122

The recovery had depended on more concerted policy actions not only to stabilize financial
conditions but also to sustain strong growth. One of the key policy actions is resolving the crisis,
and this calls for tackling faced problem in the financial and corporate sectors. Thus, government
must quickly resolve balance sheet uncertainty by dealing aggressively with distressed asserts and
recapitalizing viable institutions.
For that reason, the Korean government’s stimulation plan was focused on improving the
balance sheets of the financial and corporate sectors. Two major commercial banks were
nationalized, and the government initiated the exit process of non-viable financial institutions
through mergers, debt-equity swaps, and liquidations. In 1998, 5 of 33 banks were closed, and 3
banks were merged. 123 During this process, the Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO)

122

Aleksandra Iwulska, Golden Growth: Restructuring Private Debt, Republic of Korea, BRYCE QUILLIN FOR THE
WORLD BANK REPORT, (2011), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ECAEXT/Resources/2585981284061150155/7383639-1323888814015/8319788-1324485944855/01_korea.pdf. “The debt-to equity ratio equals
the total liabilities to shareholder’s equity. In the case of Japan, time series data for shareholder’s equity start from
2007. As a result, net assets were used instead, following the methodology of lwaisako et al.”
123

Overall, about 15% of financial institutions operating in 1997 were closed down in 1998.
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played a central role in loan consolidation. At the same time, the government supported the
remaining financial institutions through full deposit guarantees, recapitalization, and the purchase
of bad loans.
Delay in implementing comprehensive policies to stabilize financial conditions would have
resulted in a further intensification of the negative feedback loops between the real economy and
the financial system, leading to an even deeper and prolonged recession. However, KAMCO
undertook quick and strong actions to implimnet the stimulation plan in Korea. These measures
helped to quickly stabilize the financial sector. Furthermore, the centralized support packages
enabled the government to control most of the financial institutions’ decision-making process.
Through its administrative power, the Financial Supervisory Commission pressured the
commercial banks to roll over most of existing debt of small and medium enterprises until the end
of 1998.
At the same time, the banks, over which the government had control, led voluntary
corporate debt workouts for large conglomerates. Various financial restructuring methods were
used, including debt/equity swaps, asset sales, inducement of foreign investment, and new equity
injection. Eight major creditor banks, identified as leading banks, took the responsibility for
negotiating workouts with the 64 major corporate groups. In Korea, debt/equity swaps have proved
to be a very effective method to restructure highly leveraged corporations and creditor banks.
The restoration of financial sector stability and market trust is a necessary condition for
reversing the downward momentum of the economy, enhancing the effectiveness of
macroeconomic policies, and paving the way for an enduring recovery. Thus, in order to facilitate
the restructuring process of the financial and the corporate sectors, the Korean government made
some legislative changes, including the liberalization of hostile corporate takeovers by foreigners.
４６

In order to facilitate the restructuring process of the corporate sector, some legislative
changes were made, including the liberalization of hostile takeovers by foreigners. The Korean
government removed the limit to foreign ownership, and created provision for tax incentives. It
also acted to improve labor market flexibility. Fiscal support to the economy mostly focused on
the financial sector. Most of the financial (and institutional) resources that the government could
mobilize were spent on stabilizing the financial sector and the balance sheet of the corporate sector.
These efforts were followed by a fast recovery of the economy in 1999–2000 (real growth at 9.5%
and 8.5%, respectively). 124
The distinguishable facts on the Korean stimulus program are as follows. The Korean
government supported full-scale evaluations of all financial institutions to assess the balance sheets.
Based on this assessment, the government quickly decided which institutions would survive. The
Korean government response was fast and aggressive (the package in support of financial
institution amounted to 13 percent of GDP in 1998–99) 125 , and its support was strongly
conditioned on management reform. While the country had problems in the corporate sector
balance sheet, Korea’s ability to contain its downward spiral had a lot to do with the government’s
role as a moderator in the financial market and its ability to facilitate corporate sector restructuring
through creditor banks than other government in the similar situation. The Korean government did
not wait for market forces to stabilize the financial sector. Instead, it aggressively controlled the
financial institutions to keep the country’s credit system intact and to push corporate sector
restructuring.
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It is argued that the Korean financial crisis resulted from the backward financial industry
and the aggressive and imprudent behavior of Conglomerate based industrial system under the
control of the government. Thus some Korean economists suggested that the way to restore
economic vitality is to activate the function of the market mechanism. It means that the Korean
economy required an overall restructuring toward a market economy. However, in the meanwhile,
they insisted that the costs of restructuring were not shared among firms evenly under the current
economic system. Indeed, there should share the restructuring cost of labor workers and the Small
and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) be greater than those of financial companies and large firms.

V. Conclusion

The ARRA of the United States contains elements of a good strategy, but more specifics
will be needed to calm frayed market sentiment. The plan is broad in scope and include a capital
injection program for banks, the expansion of the Federal reserve’s Term Asset-backed Securities
Loan Facility (TALF) program 126, and a program to limit preventable foreclosures by encouraging
loan modifications. However, essential details are still lacking, which has limited its impact on
market conditions. Critical details concerning the valuation of distressed assets remain unclear.
The plan also does not address how severely undercapitalized or insolvent banks will be resolved,
or clarify the role of the vehicle that will hold the government’s preferred shares. Greater clarity
on all these issues will be critical to ensure the plan’s effectiveness and to alleviate financial market

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, REGULATORY REFORM: TERM ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES LOAN FACILITY
(last visited Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_talf.htm
126
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strains. The house sector needs further support. The Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan
is a step in the right direction. However, the plan focuses largely on improving affordability
through lower interest payments, with little emphasis on addressing negative equity.
In addition, generally, emerging economies should prepare, on a contingent basis, plans to
address the growing risks of large-scale corporate failures. Comprehensive mechanisms are needed
to reduce the risk of systemic solvency problems, along with a strengthening of corporate workout
frameworks. However, the ARRA has limited access to deal with possible bank runs, including
whether existing mechanisms are sufficient or if they need to be bolstered. Also, the ARRA lacks
a legal frameworks for corporate insolvencies may need to be put in place or modified to promote
efficient and predictable resolution of mounting debt problems in the corporate sector.
Economic stimulation policy should be timely, large, diversified, collective (global),
sustainable (to avoid dent explosion in the long run and adverse effects in the short run). A common
approach to deal with economic recession usually consists of two main sets of policy measures.
One is to repair the financial system, the other is to increase demand and restore confidence.
To be a successful and sustainable resolution, the policy should begin with resolution of
the financial sector. The archetypal example here is Japan, where fiscal actions following the
bursting if its asset bubble failed to achieve sustained recovery because financial sector problems
were allowed to fester. Delaying interventions, as was also done in the U.S. during the Hoover
administration and during the Savings and Loans crisis, typically leads to a worsening of
macroeconomic conditions, resulting in higher fiscal costs later on. Prompt and sizeable support
to the financial sector by the Korean authorities limited the duration of the macroeconomic
consequences thus limiting the need for the other fiscal action.
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In theory, public spending on goods and service has larger multiplier effects and, most
important in the current circumstances, its first round effects are more certain than those related to
transfers or tax cuts. In practice, the appropriate increase in public spending is constrained by the
need to avoid waste. The following is the key policy prescriptions.
First, and quite simply, governments should make sure that existing programs are not cut
for lack of resources. In particular, central governments or sub-national governments that are
facing balanced budget rules may be forced to suspend various spending programs. For subnational entities, this can be mitigated through transfers from the central government. Suspending
the rules for sub-national governments would not be appropriate as it will be difficult to reverse
the suspension later. In the U.S. increased transfers from the federal government would help states
avoid cutting various spending programs.
Second, public sector wage increases should be avoided as they are not well targeted,
difficult to reverse, and similar to transfers in their effectiveness. Nevertheless, a temporary
increase in public sector employment associated with some of new programs and policies may be
needed.
Third, in terms of tax spending matter, it should include the greater provision of
unemployment benefits, increases in earned income tax credits. Where relevant, support for
homeowners facing foreclosures, including a write-down of mortgages using public resources is
particularly appealing from a macroeconomic viewpoint as it helps not only support aggregate
demand, but also improve conditions in the financial sector.
Fourth, the government should express clearly policy with a strong commitment by policy
makers to take whatever action may be needed to avoid the tail risk of a depression, are likely to
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reduce uncertainty, lead consumers to decrease precautionary saving, as well as stop waiting and
start spending again.
Fifth, to reform firms that are facing economic distress, the government should provide
guarantees on new credit, because private financing is not available to those firms in the recession.
However, it has been argued that governments should provide support to entire high-visibility
sectors of the economy because of the potential effect that bankruptcies in these sectors may have
on expectations and thus on demand.
Sixth, the current stimulus plan was designed for long-term fiscal framework, but most
spending was in the early stage of the plan. In addition to it, the government needs to provide more
robust medium-term fiscal frameworks, as well. These should cover a period of 4-5 years and
ideally include: accurate and timely projections of government revenues and expenditures; a
government balance sheet reporting data on government assets and liabilities; a statement of
contingent liabilities and other fiscal risks; and transparent arrangements for monitoring and
reporting fiscal information for central and sub-national government, other public sector entities,
and central bank quasi-fiscal operations, on a regular and timely basis. Such frameworks should
be designed to give confidence that increase in public debt resulting from the stimulus are
eventually offset.
In the last, government should not forget that the main threat to the long-term viability of
public finances in rapidly-aging countries comes from the growth in the net cost of publicly funded
pension and health entitlements, whose net present values far exceed the magnitude of conceivable
fiscal stimulus packages.
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During a recession, government is in a better position than private investors to buy and
hold distressed private assets, it may want to do so, in effect, partly the private sector in financial
intermediation. For instance, the government could issue treasury bills and use funds to provide
financing for some of the ultimate borrows. The public sector does not have a comparative
advantage in evaluating credit risk, nor in administering a diverse portfolio of assets. A possible
solution may be to outsource the management of the banking activities to a private entity.

The government also could provide insurance against extreme recessions by offering
contracts, with payment. Bank could condition loan approvals on firms having purchased such
insurance from the government. This is analogous to the flood insurance that mortgage companies
often require from borrowers. While such contracts would most likely be attractive to firms, which
suffer disproportionately during large recessions, they could be open to individuals as well.
Temporary reduction in consumption tax rates has more disadvantages than advantages. It
might raise the purchasing power of households and encourages current consumption by lowering
its price with respect to future consumption. However, it may not be enough to encourage spending
in an uncertain environment with a crisis in confidence.
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